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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

EVERETT THOMAS,

:

Plaintiff and Appellant, :
V.

:

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
SAN JUAN SCHOOL DISTRICT,

:

Case No. 990232-CA

Priority No. 15

Defendant and Appellee.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff/appellant, Everett Thomas, brings this appeal from
an order of the Seventh Judicial District Court granting summary
judgment for defendant school district on his negligence claim.
Jurisdiction in this Court is appropriate under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) pursuant to a transfer from the Supreme
Court of Utah by order dated June 23, 1999.

ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue before the Court for review is whether the
district court correctly held that plaintiff/appellant failed to
establish any special relationship with the school district
forming grounds for a duty of care to prevent injuries he
sustained when attempting to start a vapor-locked district
vehicle.
Standard of Review:

In negligence claims, "[t]he issue of

whether a duty exists is a question of law to be determined by
the court."

Hunsaker v. State. 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993);

see also Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) (same);
Weber ex rel. Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360, 1363
(Utah 1986) ("The question of whether a 'duty1 exists is a
question of law, and this court, which is not bound by the trial
court's conclusions, may independently review the issue").

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes,
and rules pertinent to the issue before the Court for decision is
contained in the body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition
Below
Plaintiff initiated this negligence action on May 30, 1996

(R. 1-4).

The complaint alleged that the San Juan School

District breached its duty of care by negligently maintaining
and/or operating a district-owned vehicle in a dangerous
condition, leaving him with burn injuries when he voluntarily
poured gasoline into the carburetor to start the engine.

The

school district answered (R. 16-22), denying liability and
asserting a number of affirmative defenses.

The case was

assigned to a second judge (R. 10) after the first was
disqualified on plaintiff's affidavit of bias and prejudice
(R. 6-9).

Plaintiff also moved to disqualify the school

district's counsel (R. 25-33), but the motion was denied
(R. 4 7-49).

The second judge entered an order of recusal, dated
2

November 25, 1998 (R. 134-36), on the basis of his prior
involvement with a criminal case in which plaintiff was the
defendant, and a third judge was appointed (R. 172-74).
On December 1, 1998, the school district moved for summary
judgment (R. 137-38), explaining in its accompanying memorandum
(R. 13 9-68) that because it had no "special relationship" with
plaintiff, it owed him no duty of care.

Plaintiff submitted a

memorandum in opposition (R. 181-254) explicitly disavowing any
dispute of the facts the school district presented as the basis
for its motion (R. 181). The judge granted the motion
(R. 272-75), holding that plaintiff, who had volunteered his
assistance, "does not fall within the ambit of those persons to
whom [a] duty was owed" (R. 273). The court further held that
plaintiff's voluntary assistance was not foreseeable (id.).
Plaintiff's timely notice of appeal (R. 284-85) followed the
entry of the district court's final order.
B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
On May 24, 1994, Robin Benallie, a teacher employed by the

San Juan School District, drove a group of her students to a
boarding school operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in
Aneth, Utah, for the purpose of putting on a play (R. 140-41,
ilH 1-2) .
Suburban.

The vehicle she drove was a district-owned 1984
When the performance was over, Ms. Benallie and the

students loaded the Suburban for the return trip, but she was
unable to start it (R. 141, % 3 ) . She then reentered the BIA
school, by which plaintiff was employed, to call the San Juan
3

School District employee with whom she had arranged to use the
Suburban (R. 231) and who had directed her to call him if she
experienced problems with the vehicle (R. 232).
Plaintiff had seen Ms. Benallie with her students on the
step of the BIA school when he was on his way to another building
to do some photocopying (R. 161). On his way back to the main
building, some 15 to 20 minutes later, he saw a BIA janitor
trying to start the Suburban by priming the carburetor, and
stopped to volunteer his assistance (R. 161-62).

When Ms.

Benallie first observed him, he was in front of the Suburban
pouring gasoline into the carburetor (R. 154). She attempted to
talk to him, but his attention was focused on his conversation
with the janitor (R. 163). By plaintiff's own admission, Ms.
Benallie never asked him to assist her (R. 165-66).

As he

continued to pour gasoline into the carburetor and the vehicle
backfired, the gasoline exploded, burning both plaintiff and Ms.
Benallie (R. 166-67).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court's decision in the school district's favor
was based on the absence of a duty running to plaintiff based on
either "special relationship" or foreseeability grounds.

Rather

than citing evidence of record that demonstrates error in the
court's analysis on these essential points, plaintiff argues only
that the school district's general duty not to use a vehicle
which it knew or should have known posed an unreasonable risk of
4

harm to others necessarily reaches him and warrants a trial on
the issue of its breach.

His presumption that he lies within the

class of protected "others" wrongly focuses his argument on the
scope of the district's duty rather than on its applicability to
him.
Although an abundance of Utah case law addresses the factors
which bear on the establishment of a "special relationship"
conferring a duty, plaintiff has chosen to support his argument
primarily with non-binding case law from other jurisdictions.
His dissatisfaction with the result under Utah law does not
diminish its authority.

The evidence of record shows that

plaintiff was neither a foreseeable victim of the school
district's actions nor one to whom the district owed a special
duty of care.

Consequently, plaintiff has demonstrated no

reversible error for this Court to correct.

ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFF'S CASE CANNOT GO FORWARD BECAUSE HE WAS
NOT A FORESEEABLE VICTIM OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT'S
ACTIONS AND THE SCHOOL DISTRICT DID NOT OWE A DUTY OF
CARE TO HIM INDIVIDUALLY.
As established by the Supreme Court of Utah, "[o]ne
essential element of a negligence action is a duty of reasonable
care owed to the plaintiff by defendant.
duty, [a plaintiff] cannot recover."

Absent a showing of a

Beach v. Univ. of Utah, 726

P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted) (emphasis added);
see also Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151 (negligence plaintiff "must
first establish a duty of care owed by the defendant to the
5

plaintiff").

Plaintiff asserts that, as the owner of the

allegedly defective Suburban, the school district "had the legal
duty to maintain that vehicle in good and safe operating
condition" (Brief of Appellant at 11). He then leaps to the
conclusion that because he was injured when the Suburban
backfired, he was necessarily a foreseeable victim to whom that
duty ran.

This leap in logic is belied by the cautionary words

in one of the cases on which he explicitly relies:

"the concept

of duty should not be equated with specific details of conduct.
Duty refers to the relationship between individuals; it imposes a
legal obligation on one party for the benefit of the other party.
The specific details of conduct involved do not determine the
duty owed but bear on the issue of whether a defendant has
breached a duty owed."

Alhambra Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court,

165 Ariz. 38, 796 P.2d 470, 473 (1990).

Absent a duty to

plaintiff, there can be no breach.
The district court determined "that it was not
foreseeable that the Plaintiff would voluntarily attempt to
assist the Defendant by pouring gasoline in the carburetor with
the attendant injury.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff was not within

the scope of those persons to whom the duty was owed" (R. 273).
Plaintiff does not take issue directly with this conclusion.
Instead, he attempts to sidestep it by arguing, in essence, that
had the allegedly defective vehicle not been in his presence
through the school district's violation of its duty, he would not
have volunteered to help start it and consequently would not have
6

been injured.

While supporting his claim by asserting that Ms.

Benallie "requested help and stood by while something she knew to
be dangerous was occurring" (Brief of Appellant at 13, n.l), he
ignores completely his own admission that she never sought his
assistance (R. 165-66) and that when she attempted to speak with
him, he didn't pay attention to what she was saying because he
was already involved in efforts to start the Suburban (R. 163).
Ms. Benallie's actions are simply insufficient to create a duty
elevating plaintiff's status to that of a foreseeable victim.
Moreover, under Utah law, "[t]o hold a government agency or
one of its agents liable for negligence or gross negligence, a
plaintiff cannot recover for the breach of a duty owed to the
general public, but must show that a duty is owed to him or her
as an individual."

Madsen v. Borthick, 850 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah

1993); see also Hunsaker, 870 P.2d at 897 (special relationship
duty is "necessary premise for any negligence liability of the
State actors"); Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151 ("plaintiff must show a
breach of a duty owed him as an individual, not merely the breach
of an obligation owed to the general public at large by the
governmental official"); Higcrins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P. 2d
231, 236 (Utah 1993) (same); Cannon v. Univ. of Utah, 866 P.2d
586, 589 (Utah App. 1993) ("when the government deals generally
with the welfare of all, it does so without a duty to anyone,
unless there is a 'special relationship' between the government
and the individual").

Plaintiff avers in his complaint that

defendant "is a public body and a governmental entity" (R. 1,

7

1 2 ) ; he is consequently bound by the requirement to show that
the school district owed him a duty beyond the duty it owed to
the public at large.

His attempt to eliminate the "special

relationship" requirement from this case runs contrary to binding
Utah precedent.
Plaintiff asserts that the school district violated a duty
to him through its failure to protect him, claiming that "Ms.
Benallie did not give any instructions to anyone and did not try
to stop Mr. Thomas, or anyone else, from trying to start the
engine in the way being attempted by Mr. Ebert, his co-employee,
and Mr. Thomas" (Brief of Appellant at 8 ) . Accepting this
allegation as true, solely for purposes of this argument, it does
not relieve plaintiff of the necessity of showing a "special
relationship" with the school district.

"In cases where the

alleged negligence consists of a failure to act, the person
injured by another's inaction must demonstrate the existence of
some special relationship between the parties creating a duty on
the part of the latter to exercise such due care in behalf of the
former."

DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah

1983); see also Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832,
835 (Utah 1984); Turnbauah v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939, 944 (Utah
App. 1990).
As to whether plaintiff established a "special relationship
with the school district, the court explained,

8

Although the court finds that the [defendant]1
owed a duty of due care to properly maintain the 1984
Suburban, the Court finds that the Plaintiff does not
fall within the ambit of those persons to whom the duty
was owed. The 1984 Suburban was disabled in a parking
lot, allegedly with "vapor lock," when the Plaintiff
offered to help without being asked by Defendant or any
of its agents. The Court cannot find, on the basis of
the record, that the Defendant, through any of its
agents, including Ms. Benallie, assumed responsibility
for the safety of the Plaintiff who was a "volunteer."
Under the circumstances of this case, there were no
"special relationships" existing between the Plaintiff
and the Defendant as discussed in Beach v. University
of Utah, 726 P.2d 312 (Utah 1986) at 415, that would
impose a duty to protect the Plaintiff.
R. 273.

In Beach, the supreme court noted that "[o]rdinarily, a

party does not have an affirmative duty to care for another."
Beach v. Univ. of Utah, 726 P.2d at 415.

The court further

observed that "[t]he law imposes upon one party an affirmative
duty to act only when certain special relationships exist between
the parties.

Those relationships generally arise when one

assumes responsibility for another's safety or deprives another
of his or her normal opportunities for self-protection."

Id.

Plaintiff has pointed to nothing in the record that suggests the
school district, through Ms. Benallie or otherwise, took
responsibility for his safety or denied him his normal
opportunities for self-protection.

In fact, he rebuffed Ms.

Benallie's attempted communication (R. 163) in favor of the
conversation he initiated with others who were attempting to
start the Suburban, as revealed by his deposition testimony:
Q:

As you were walking back did anyone stop you

*The order mistakenly reads, "Although the Court finds that
the Plaintiff owed a duty of care . . . " (R. 273).
9

A
Q
A

Q:
A:
Q:
A:

or ask you to do something?
No.
Okay. Tell me what you did next then.
Then I came and talked to [BIA janitor] Ebert and
said, "What happened, you guys? Won't start?"
And I did talk straight to -- express back and
forth about what Mr. Star [Ebert] was doing. And
he said that, "Well, these kids got stuck and they
couldn't start it and something happened to them."
And the hood was already open. And so I
stopped right there and said, "If you need a hand,
I'll help you."
So that's when I started helping him. And
that's - - a t the time he had a coffee can of gas
And Robin Benallie was already there?
She was already there, standing with the kids on
the other side on the step.
Did you talk to her?
I don't specifically remember exact words, what
she said, but I know she said something. But
mostly I responded to the guy that was talking to
me straight and forth to the vehicle, which was
Mr. Star. I keep telling him, "I pour [the
gasoline] now, you start it now and see what
happens.

R. 162-63.

Far from showing the creation of a "special

relationship," this exchange demonstrates that plaintiff ignored
Ms. Benallie and involved himself in the situation without her
encouragement or solicitation.

Rather than being denied his

normal opportunities for self-protection, he willingly exposed
himself to the dangers that ultimately caused his injury.
Further, his testimony shows that he directed at least a part of
the action:
Q:

A:

Tell me what you remember happening then. You've
told me you are pouring the gas in. Did you
expect Mr. Star to try to turn the engine as you
were pouring gas in? Or was he supposed to wait
until you told him to go ahead?
Well, it seemed like the amount of time that he
did it himself -- you know, he poured it in there
and he got in the vehicle, it backfired and kind
of choked a little bit -- I think that's the
10

Q:
A:

backfiring. Kind of shoo, and then it stopped.
That's when I went over there. And we waited and
then I poured it in and I told him to start it
then, "Turn it right now." So that's when -- I
had the can away from the carburetor.
An that's when the flames -No. That's when he started again and did the same
thing. It was turning and starting to turn and
then it conked out. So my third time I approach
it -- that's where I don't know if he turned the
keys on or if there was some spark in there or if
there was flames in there. As I pour it in, all
of a sudden it just shoo and hell broke loose. So
I don't really know if he had the keys on or if he
was doing it. But I know I ordered him to turn on
--I don't know if I told him to turn it on, but I
was pouring the gas, and that's when it blew up in
our face.

R. 166-67.
Plaintiff has failed to distinguish himself from any other
member of the public with respect to the defendant school
district.

Anyone could have stopped to volunteer assistance in

the same way he did.

He was not singled out by an agent of the

school district requesting his help.

His actions were not

directed by an agent of the school district.

In fact, Ms.

Benallie testified in her deposition that just before the
backfire, "I was telling him, 'Well, I just called [the school
district].

They told me to leave it alone.1

me, 'Oh, we can get it started' or something.

And I think he told
And then I don't

know if they started -- I think they started the engine, and then
flames shot up" (R. 154).

It appears from this uncontroverted

testimony that plaintiff was acting against, not in compliance
with, Ms. Benallie's express intentions.
The Suburban, at rest in the boarding school parking lot,
was not dangerous to anyone.

Only when plaintiff unforeseeably
11

involved himself in attempting to restart it in a dangerous
manner did it become a mechanism of injury.

Plaintiff stood in

no different relationship to the school district than any other
member of the public.

The school district did not act to deprive

him of his normal means of self-protection or to guarantee his
safety.

Because, under these circumstances, the school district

owed no affirmative duty of care to plaintiff individually, the
district court correctly granted summary judgment in its favor.
Plaintiff has provided no reasoned analysis on which to base a
reversal of that decision.
II. THE CASES ON WHICH PLAINTIFF RELIES ARE EASILY
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE PRESENT ACTION.
Plaintiff cites a number of cases, primarily from other
jurisdictions, in support of his argument that the school
district owes him a duty of care.
11-15.

See Brief of Appellant at

Each of these cases is easily distinguishable from the

case at bar.
Two of the cases are cited for the proposition "that the
owner of a vehicle may be held liable to a third person for
personal injuries caused by a defective condition of which the
owner had or should have had knowledge" (Brief of Appellant at
12).

However, the result in both cases turns on statutory

liability.

In Murry v. Advanced Asphalt Co., 751 P.2d 209 (Okla.

App. 1987), the plaintiff was injured when her vehicle was struck
by a trailer that had become separated from a dump truck.

The

evidence showed that the trailer had not been properly secured
with a pin and safety chains as required by statute.
12

The court

held that the statutory violation constituted negligence per se.
Murry, 751 P.2d at 212.

Bush v. Middleton, 340 P.2d 474 (Okla.

1959), involved a plaintiff who was injured in an automobile
collision when the brakes failed on a car belonging to Middleton
while it was being driven by a potential purchaser.

The

appellate court reversed the demurrer in favor of Middleton on
grounds of statutory requirements mandating adequate brakes and
prohibiting a vehicle owner from permitting an unsafe vehicle to
be driven on a highway.

In the present case, plaintiff has

pointed to no statutory duty violated by the school district.
Thus, these cases are inapposite.
Plaintiff also cites Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 418
So.2d 493 (La. 1982), in support of his claim that an owner's
actual or constructive knowledge of a chattel's defective
condition confers a duty on the owner to take reasonable steps to
protest against injurious consequences of that condition.
However, the case interpreted a Louisiana Civil Code provision
under Louisiana case law.

Plaintiff has made no showing of a

similar Utah statute.
To establish the breadth of foreseeability, plaintiff
invokes two Arizona cases and an Oklahoma case.

Although Rudolph

v. Arizona B.A.S.S. Federation, 182 Ariz. 622, 898 P.2d 1000
(1995), does stand for the general proposition that Arizona
courts view the class of risks and the class of foreseeable
victims broadly in establishing a duty between litigants,
plaintiff fails to recognize that, in contrast, when suing a
13

government entity in Utah, he must establish a special duty of
care owed to him individually (see Point I, supra).

Alhambra

School District v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 38, 796 P.2d 470
(1990), turns again on statutory as well as common law duty under
Arizona, not Utah, interpretation.

Moreover, both cases were

decided subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court of
Arizona in Ryan v. State, which abandoned the public duty
doctrine that had been adopted in Massencrill v. Yuma County, 104
Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969):
11

[W] e conclude that the doctrine in Massengill
should
be abandoned and that case is overruled. We shall no
longer engage in the speculative exercise of
determining whether the tort-feasor has a general duty
to the injured party, which spells no recovery, or if
he had a specific individual duty which means recovery.
Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597, 599 (1982).

As

discussed above, the public duty doctrine is alive and well in
Utah.

And while Baine v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 850 P.2d

346 (Okla. App. 1992), states a general rule extending a duty to
all foreseeably endangered persons, it also notes that a duty to
the particular plaintiff is a threshold question (Baine, 850 P.2d
at 348)--one that was unmet by the plaintiff in that case.

As

the Baine court recognized, the defendant was under "no duty to
'anticipate every possible fortuitous circumstance that might
cause injurious contacts'" with the mechanism of injury.

Id. at

349-50 (quoting Florida Power and Light Co. v. Lively, 465 So.2d
1270, 1274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
Even the Utah cases plaintiff cites are unavailing.

14

Language he quotes from Hoffman v. Life Insurance Co. of North
America, 669 P.2d 410, 416 (Utah 1983), acknowledging
foreseeability as a measure of the scope of a defendant's duty in
tort, is presented only as a general premise against which to
contrast the interpretation of contractual language at issue in
the case.

Such general statements do little to illuminate the

"special relationship" plaintiff is obligated to show in order to
recover against a Utah governmental defendant.

Nor does Drysdale

ex rel. Strong v. Rogers, 869 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1994), serve
plaintiff's contentions.

Not only does it emphasize the general

applicability of the "special relationship" analysis in Utah (869
P.2d at 2 ) , but finds no special relationship--and hence, no
duty--between the plaintiff and defendant on the facts of the
case.
As noted in Point I above, it is well established in Utah
case law that unless plaintiff can demonstrate a duty running to
him as an individual distinct from the general public, defendant
is necessarily without liability to him.

Plaintiff cannot bypass

this showing by relying on less rigorous standards of courts in
other jurisdictions.

His reliance on these non-controlling cases

ought not to be credited.

CONCLUSION
In the district court, plaintiff failed to establish an
essential element of his negligence claim:
him an individual duty of care.

that defendant owed

No further inquiry was necessary
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to dispose of the case, as without a duty, no liability for
negligence is possible.

Plaintiff's attempt to skip over this

threshold inquiry cannot overcome his burden of proof.

Because

he did not meet that burden, the district court's grant of
summary judgment to the school district warrants this Court's
affirmance.
Therefore, defendant respectfully requests the Court to
affirm the judgment of the district court.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
Defendant believes the law is sufficiently established as to
the issue in this case that a decision can be rendered without
oral argument and published opinion.

However, in the event that

oral argument is ordered by the Court, defendant wishes to
participate.

Dated this

[4r-

day of September, 1999.

i-C

Nancy ii. Kemp
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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